Kasumbalesa in crisis: When concession contracts go wrong

More than 2,500 trucks are stranded at the Kasumbalesa border crossing between Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). MIKE FITZMAURICE says this exposes how weak concession structures, poor planning and inadequate oversight can transform vital infrastructure into a regional economic crisis. 

The Kasumbalesa border post, the busiest crossing in the Southern African Development Community (SADC), has descended into chaos. Over 2,500 trucks are stranded, creating gridlock that stretches for kilometres and threatens to cripple regional trade. While the official explanation points to necessary upgrading works, the reality on the ground tells a more troubling story: this is a cautionary tale of a poorly constructed public-private partnership (PPP) concession that ignored international norms and best practices.

A billion-dollar bottleneck

Before the current upgrade works commenced, the Kasumbalesa border was processing between 450 and 500 trucks daily into the DRC. This figure has now plummeted to between 200 and 250 trucks per day. The economic impact is immediate and severe, delaying the transport of critical minerals such as copper and cobalt – the lifeblood of the regional economy.

The Zambian government has signed a US$110 million concession agreement with a Zambian consortium to modernise the border post, with plans for a 2,000-capacity truck park and a multi-facility economic zone. A parking facility of this size at a One-Stop Border Post (OSBP) is generally considered a major red flag. While massive truck stops sound helpful, building a facility of this scale at an OSBP often points to deep problems in how the border handles trade.

A 2,000-truck capacity usually means the border is acting as a massive warehouse rather than a fast-moving transit point. Efficient OSBPs should process cargo rapidly so trucks do not need to sit for lengthy periods. OSBPs are built for flow and are designed to combine government checks into one step to shorten waiting times.

Needing space for 2,000 trucks implies that the system is chronically blocked by slow paperwork, system failures or slow manual inspections. Storing this many heavy vehicles in one place also creates a highly vulnerable area. It requires expensive security, sanitation facilities and medical and wellness centres to prevent humanitarian crises for drivers.

Fix the processes, not the parking

The goal of modern logistics is pre-clearance. If transport companies and clearing agents submit paperwork before the trucks arrive, most trucks can drive straight through without needing to park. Most border experts look for smaller buffer zones – often holding a few hundred trucks – that handle the immediate flow for the day.

These buffer zones should focus strictly on holding vehicles while customs paperwork is actively being processed. Instead of planning a large-scale static park, the focus should be on fixing the border processes that create the queues.

• Increase processing hours: Extend operating hours so traffic does not build up overnight.
• Upgrade IT networks: Ensure both countries share digital systems so clearance times drop from days to minutes.
• Separate cargo and travellers: Build separate lanes so freight does not get stuck behind passenger cars and buses.

Questions over experience

On paper, this project is intended to ease congestion and facilitate trade. However, the manner in which the concession was structured – and, more importantly, who was chosen to execute it – have created a perfect storm. At the heart of the crisis is a concession agreement that appears to have been drafted in a vacuum, divorced from the fundamental principles that govern successful international infrastructure projects.

Media reports indicate that a private party with no relevant experience was awarded the PPP concession. The Zambian consortium is managing the project, but scrutiny suggests a lack of the specialist expertise required to redevelop a 24/7 operational border post.

Unlike the Beitbridge Border Post modernisation in Zimbabwe – a US$300-million PPP lauded for its efficiency and structured implementation – the Kasumbalesa project lacks the hallmarks of a professionally managed international consortium with a credible track record.

A built-in conflict of interest

Further compounding the issue is the vertical integration of the project. The engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) contractor is an associate company of the concessionaire. This structure creates a significant conflict of interest and removes the checks and balances typically imposed by an arm’s-length relationship.

Under normal circumstances, a concessionaire would be put on notice for delays and congestion, with penalties passed on to the EPC contractor. In this case, any penalties would effectively be paid to an associate, rendering the clause toothless. This structure is reminiscent of less sophisticated markets identified by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), where low compliance with international standards often leads to project failures.

No independent lender oversight

The deal features no involvement from international banks or a Lenders’ Technical Advisor (LTA). This is a critical red flag. International lenders impose rigorous due diligence, demanding adherence to international standards in design, construction and operation to protect their investments. Without this oversight, the project lacks an independent technical voice to ensure that the work is fit for purpose and that operational disruptions (such as the current congestion) are minimised.

Standard international guidelines explicitly recommend that “the necessary financing is in place” and that “bank guarantees or parent company guarantees” are secured as conditions precedent to the commencement of the concession. The absence of these structures suggests a non-standard agreement that prioritises speed over substance.

No effective decanting solution

Perhaps the most glaring oversight is the apparent failure to agree on a decanting solution. When upgrading a live, 24/7 facility, international best practice dictates that a plan must be in place to “decant”, or move, operations to a temporary facility to avoid disrupting traffic flow.

A functioning dry port or staging area is essential to maintain clearance capacity while construction is under way. The DRC recently signed a separate US$600-million concession for a dry port at Kasumbalesa, but that is a separate project running according to its own timeline.

The failure to integrate a temporary logistics solution into the Zambian upgrade plan has resulted in the current “chaos logistique chronique”, as described by regional experts.

The consequences are already visible

The situation at Kasumbalesa is a textbook example of what happens when international norms are ignored. The consequences are not theoretical; they appear in the form of kilometres of stranded trucks, lost time, increased costs, public frustration and damage to regional trade.

Kasumbalesa should be treated as a cautionary case: critical border infrastructure must not be redeveloped through weak concession structures, inexperienced implementation arrangements, related-party delivery chains and inadequate independent oversight. A border post PPP must be bankable, enforceable, technically credible and operationally realistic from day one.

A warning for future border projects

As the Zambian government looks to replicate the PPP model at other borders, such as Mokambo and Solwezi-Kipushi, the Kasumbalesa debacle must serve as a stark warning. There is no substitute for rigorous international standards.

The rush to sign deals without proper vetting, independent oversight and robust risk management builds bottlenecks, not infrastructure. Until international finance and good governance principles are applied, projects such as Kasumbalesa will continue to prioritise form over function, holding the region’s economy hostage.